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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jerry Leonard Ellis,

II,

appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his

successive post—conviction relief petition.

Statement

Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

The

district court set forth the

underlying facts and proceedings relevant to this case as

follows:

In the criminal case, Petitioner pled guilty to a felony

and the Court oprpeals afﬁrmed

in

DULU]

Petitioner appealed,

an unpublished decision (Dkt. Nos. 40898 and

40901).[2]

Petitioner then ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief, Kootenai

CR-2014-7988,

in

which he alleged

that the State erred

medical care, that he received ineffective assistance of

County Case No.

by providing incorrect

trial

counsel, that the

trial

Judge made numerous errors, and that he received ineffective assistance 0f
appellate counsel. That petition was dismissed 0n the State’s motion for summary
dismissal.

(Aug. R., pp.1-2.) According t0 the iCourt Portal, Ellis

No. CV-2014-7988, the

was entered on August

district court’s

8,

2

Ellis

order granting the state’s motion for

his offense

own motion;

0n September

the Remittitur

6,

1,

summary

dismissal

2015, the appeal was

was entered 0n March

30, 2016.3

2009. (R., pp.38-39.)

Docket Nos. 40898/40901, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 751 (Idaho App.,
2014); the Remittitur was ﬁled on January 5, 2015. (R., pp.202, 249.)

See State

Oct. 7,
3

committed

Kootenai County District Court

2015, and after Ellis ﬁled an appeal on October

dismissed 0n (presumably) his

1

V. State,

V. Ellis,

ﬁled a federal habeas corpus petition 0n October 27, 2015, and an amended habeas petition
on July 11, 2016. (Appellant’s Brief, p.16; Aug. R., pp.325-358). On December 11, 2018, the
Ellis

federal court entered an order denying or
V. Little,

1:15-CV-00515-BLW, 2018

summarily dismissing all 0f Ellis’s habeas claims.
6540219, at *10 (D. Idaho Dec. 11, 2018).

WL

1

LES

Ellis

ﬁled a pro se “second” petition for post—conviction relief (with a supporting afﬁdavit),

and a motion for appointment of counsel, on April
an Answer

(R., pp.59-62). Ellis

according to the

(1) [He]

18,

2018

(R., pp.7-26, 55-58).

ﬁled a pro se amended second petition

district court, Ellis

(R., pp.

1

The

state

ﬁled

11-139), in which,

claimed:

was convicted under an unconstitutional

statute (LC. § 18-8002), (2) Illegal

search and seizure, (3) Ineffective assistance of counsel, (4) Involuntary and
unintelligently made plea, (5) [He] was denied his request t0 speak t0 his counsel

by a police ofﬁcer before submitting

Evidence of material
Ineffective assistance 0f post-

t0 scientiﬁc testing, (6)

facts not previously presented 0r heard,

and

(7)

conviction relief appellate counsel in Case N0. CV—2014-7988 and Case N0.

2014-7938.

(Aug. R., p.2. See also R., p.112.) The state ﬁled a motion for

summary

209), and (after Ellis failed t0 ﬁle a response) a reply in support 0f
disposition (R., pp.393-396).

state’s

Ellis,

On

February

14,

disposition (R., pp.200-

its

motion for summary

through appointed counsel, ﬁled a brief in opposition t0 the

motion for summary disposition

pp.421-429).

CV-

Amended Second Petitionfor Post-Conviction Relief, p.2.

(R., pp.408—419),

2019, the

and the

district court entered a

state

ﬁled a second reply

(R.,

“Memorandum Decision and

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition” (Aug. R., pp.1-1 1), followed by
a “Judgment Dismissing Post Conviction Petition” (R., pp.445-446). Ellis timely appealed. (R.,

pp.447—457.)

ISSUES
Ellis states the issues
1.

Did

0n appeal

as:

by denying Mr. Ellis’s “equitable tolling” 0f the
0f limitations t0 raise grounds A, B, C, D, E, and F pursuant t0 I.C.
19-4902(a) due t0 trial and post—conviction counsels’ false, erroneous
the district court err

statute

§
legal advice “thwarting”
2.

Did the

district court err

Mr.

Ellis’s diligence?

by denying Mr.

Ellis’s successive petition for post-

conviction relief pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-4908 due t0 trial and post—conviction
counsels’ false, erroneous legal advice “thwarting” Mr. Ellis’s diligence

pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-4902(a)?
3.

Did the

district court err

by denying Mr.

Ellis’s successive petition for post-

conviction relief due t0 ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief

counsel?
4.

Did the

district court err

by ruling trial counsel (Fred Loats) hadn’t provided

the petitioner (Mr. Ellis) ineffective assistance of counsel?
5.

Did

the district court err [by] striking Mr. Ellis’s

amended petition

as post-

conviction counsel had provided ineffective assistance, and petitioner

was

without counsel?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7 (spelling, punctuation,

grammar and numbering modiﬁed; explanation

added).4)

The

state rephrases the issue(s) as:

Has

Ellis failed to

demonstrate that the

district court erred

by summarily dismissing

his

successive post—conviction claims 0f ineffective assistance of trial and post—conviction counsel?

4

References t0 page numbers are based on the numbers appearing on the
0f the Appellant’s Brief.

Adobe Reader pdf format

ARGUMENT
Ellis

Has Failed T0 Demonstrate That The

Successive Post—Conviction Claims

District

Of Ineffective

Court Erred
Assistance

By Summarilv Dismissing His
Of Trial And Post-Conviction

C0u_nsel

A.

Introduction

The
relief,

by

district court

ﬁnding: (1)

it

was untimely under LC.

equitable tolling based

Missouri

V.

summarily dismissed

§ 19-4902(a),

§

19-4908, and, under

in

0f ineffective assistance

19-4901(b) “because they could have been 0r

direct appea1[,]” (3) because Ellis’s petition

I.C. §

Supreme Court’s decision

States

(2) except for the allegations

of counsel, the claims were forfeited under LC.

were waived under

and the untimeliness was not remedied

on when he discovered the United

McNeelv, 569 U.S. 141 (2013),

were raised on

Ellis’s successive petition for post-conviction

Mugphy

was a “successive”

petition, its claims

156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365

V. State,

(2014), post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness “cannot constitute a ‘sufﬁcient reason’ t0 bring

a successive petition[,]” and (4) Ellis failed to
t0

McNeely was deﬁcient

show that his trial counsel’s performance with regard

0r prejudicial under Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

(Aug. R., pp.3-10.)

On

appeal, Ellis contends that the district court erred

by

0f the one-year limitation period — although his counsel in his
erroneously advised

him

t0 ﬁle a

McNeely claim

his successive petition

under LC.

post-conviction counsel, (4) ruling that his

With regard t0 his

McNeely claim, and

initial

— even though

McNeely provided him
§ 19-4902(a)

post-conviction proceeding

denying him the

his trial

ability to

and post—conviction

sufﬁcient reason t0 do so, (3) denying

— notwithstanding

trial

denying him equitable tolling

in federal court, (2)

ﬁle a successive petition pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-4908
counsels’ erroneous advice about

(1)

the ineffective assistance of his

counsel had not provided ineffective assistance

(5) “striking” his

amended post-conviction petition — even

though he was effectively “without counsel” because his post—conviction counsel provided
ineffective assistance.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

Ellis

has failed t0 demonstrate that the

district

court erred.

Standard

B.

The

Of Review

appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s application of the

Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky
968 (2001).

On

appeal from

summary

reviews the record to determine
applicant’s favor,

would

if a

genuine issue 0f material fact

entitle the applicant t0 the

requested

V. State,

exists,

relief.

if resolved in the

which,

Matthews

V. State,

V.

Conchemco,

Inc., 111

Standards Applicable To

C.

19-4901, et seq.

Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims
by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates

a

new and independent

proceeding in Which the petitioner bears the burden 0f establishing that he

Workman

V. State,

fact exists.

Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

Post-conviction proceedings are governed

§

122 Idaho

132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755

App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material

Edwards

LC.

136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court

801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman

(Ct.

V. State,

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State

V.

is

civil

entitled to relief.

Bearshield, 104 Idaho

676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal 0f an application for post-conviction
relief, in

response t0 a party’s motion or 0n the court’s

own

initiative, if the applicant

“has not

presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon

Which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg

V. State,

131 Idaho 5 17, 518, 960 P.2d 738,

739 (1998). Until controverted by the
are, for

state, allegations in

a veriﬁed post-conviction application

purposes of determining Whether t0 hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed

m, 96 Idaho

542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court

either the applicant’s

mere conclusory

applicant’s conclusions of law.

Roman

V. State,

allegations, unsupported

Farrier

V. State,

is

assistance 0f counsel.

by speciﬁc

m,

facts,

125 Idaho

at

Cooper

0r the

135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);

Bare assertions and

do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective
649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, allegations contained

in a post-conViction petition are insufﬁcient for granting relief When they are clearly disproved

at

522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau

V. State,

by

Workman, 144

the record of the original proceeding or d0 not justify relief as a matter of law.

Idaho

V.

not required to accept

by admissible evidence,

125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

speculation, unsupported

true.

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

commenced by

Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be

ﬁling a petition “any time within one (1) year from the expiration 0f the time for appeal 0r from
the determination 0f an appeal 0r

Whichever

is later.”

from the determination of proceedings following an appeal,

Absent a showing by the petitioner

that the limitation period should

be

tolled,

the failure t0 ﬁle a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition.

Evensiosky

V. State,

The only

136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001).

three circumstances in

4902(a) statute of limitations
facility

(2)

on an

are: (1)

in—state conviction

Which Idaho recognizes equitable
where the

petitioner

tolling

was incarcerated

0f the LC.

in

§ 19-

an out—of—state

Without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials;

Where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a

petitioner incompetent

and

prevents the petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges t0 his conviction; and (3) in limited
circumstances, Where the petitioner

was unaware 0f the

factual basis underlying post-conviction

claim.

E

Schultz V. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations

omitted).

A successive petition for post-cviction relief is generally not permissible.
(claims not raised in

§

19-4908

post—conviction proceedings generally waived). Only in cases where

show “sufﬁcient reason” Why claims were “inadequately presented

the petitioner can

original case,”

initial

LC.

may

he have the opportunity t0

re-litigate

them. Grifﬁn

441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted);

ﬂ alﬂ

V. State,

LC.

in the

142 Idaho 438,

§ 19-4908.

An

analysis

0f Whether “sufﬁcient reason” exists t0 ﬁle a successive petition includes an analysis of Whether
the petition

was ﬁled Within a “reasonable time”

for the claim.

Charboneau V.

What a reasonable time

is

State,

after the petitioner’s discovery

of the factual basis

144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). “In determining

for ﬁling a successive petition, [the court] Will simply consider

it

0n a

case-by—case basis, as has been done in capital cases.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at
875.

D.

Standards Applicable T0 Ineffective Assistance

A post-conviction petitioner

Of Counsel Claims

alleging ineffective assistance 0f counsel

both deﬁcient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland
88 (1984); State

V.

V.

must demonstrate

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Under Strickland,

a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel’s performance

fell

below an objective

standard 0f reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result

0f the proceedings would have been

m,

different.

Strickland,

466 U.S.

114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988).

counsel’s conduct

is

There

is

at

687-688, 694; Aragon

V.

a strong presumption that

Within the Wide range 0f reasonable professional assistance. Gibson V. State,

110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis

V. State,

116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,

1248

(Ct.

States

App. 1989). In assessing the prejudice prong

Supreme Court has explained the focus

ineffective performance affected the

in the context

of guilty pleas, the United

upon “Whether counsel’s

is

outcome 0f the plea process.”

constitutionally

Hill V. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52,

59 (1985). The Court explained, “in other words, in order t0 satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement,
the defendant

must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,

would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted

0n going t0

trial.”

Li; Cosio-Nava

he

V. State,

161 Idaho 44, 48, 383 P.3d 1214, 1218 (2016).

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Ellis Failed To Make APrz'ma Facie Showing
For Post-Conviction Relief With Respect To Any Of His Claims

E.

For

its

response to Ellis’s arguments, the state relies upon, and incorporates as

forth herein, the district court’s

for

Summary

if fully set

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion

Disposition (Aug. R., pp.1-11), which

is

addition t0 the court’s analysis and conclusions, the state

attached to this brief as Appendix A.

makes the following arguments

In

in support

0f the court’s decision and order.

The Idaho Court oprpeals afﬁrmed the revocation 0f Ellis’s probation and execution ofhis
previously suspended sentence 0n October

7,

2014. State

Unpublished Opinion N0. 75 1 (Idaho App. Oct.
5,

7,

V. Ellis,

Docket Nos. 40898/40901, 2014

2014). The Remittitur

was issued on January

2015. (R., pp.202, 249.) Ellis ﬁled his successive post-conviction petition on April 18, 2018.

(R., pp.7-26.)

He was

therefore required to

post-conviction petition

make

more than three years

of whether that showing

is

a showing justifying his ﬁling 0f a successive

after the conclusion ofhis direct appeal. Regardless

analyzed under the equitable tolling standards relating to I.C.

4902(a)’s one-year statute of limitation for original post-conviction petitions,

§ 19-

0r the “sufﬁcient

reason” and “reasonable time” standards for a newly discovered basis for relief under LC. § 19-

4908, Ellis has failed t0

make

the required showing.

On appeal, Ellis attempts t0 avoid the untimeliness ofhis successive post-conviction petition
by contending

when he

that

read the

McNeely

decision in September 2015 (see R., pp.28-30), he

Supreme Court

realized for the very ﬁrst time that Schmerber,5 a 1966

suppression 0f the non-consensual blood draw done 0n

him

(Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1 3- 1 6.) Ellis blames his counsel in his

initial

him

t0 present his

McNeely claim

As the

See iCourt Portal,

law enforcement’s request.

post-conviction case for telling

in a federal habeas corpus petition.

16.) Ellis’s initial post-conviction case

30, 2016.

at

decision, required

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-

became ﬁnal upon the issuance 0f the Remittitur 0n March

Ellis V. State,

Kootenai County District Court No. CV-2014-7988.

successive post-conviction court concluded (see Aug. R., p5), even if Ellis “became aware”

of his McNeely—Schmerber claim n0

later

than

When he ﬁled his

federal habeas corpus petition

on

July 11, 2016 (which included that claim; see R., pp.332-333), he did not ﬁle his successive postconviction petition until April 18, 2018

— over one year and nine months

later

— Which

is

not a

reasonable time under LC. § 19-4908 and Charboneau.6

None 0f the
Ellis.

the

See

three reasons to toll the one-year limitation period of LC. § 19-4902(a) apply to

m,

legal basis

151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Although Ellis alleges he

was unaware 0f

underlying his successive post-conviction claim until he read McNeely’s

“reafﬁrmation” and “logical interpretation” of Schmerber (see Appellant’s Brief, pp.12, 21, 29),
that does not sufﬁce. Ellis’s

5

6

See Schmerber

argument that Schmerber dictates

V. California,

that the non-consensual

blood-draw

384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Supreme Court held that, in that non-capital case, the second
was untimely because Charboneau waited 13 months after discovering
evidence supporting a Brady claim t0 ﬁle his petition. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870.
In Charboneau, the Idaho

successive petition

9

done on him be deemed unconstitutional, and
defeating; if true,

that

McNeely merely reafﬁrmed Schmerber,

McNeely could not have provided Ellis with

a

is self-

new ground for relief that did not

already exist under Schmerber, decided in 1966. See LC. §19-4908. But see State V. Halseth, 157

Idaho 643, 645, 339 P.3d 368, 370 (2014) (“In reliance on Schmerber,
Woolery,

1

this

Court held in State

16 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 12 1 0 (1989), that ‘the destruction ofthe evidence

by metabolism

of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency Which justiﬁes the warrantless search.’

The United

States

Supreme Court again changed

its

mind, and in McNeely

it

v.

.

.

.

held that ‘the natural

dissipation 0f alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufﬁcient

t0 justify conducting a

L.Ed.2d
the

at 715”);

blood

test

United States

V.

Without a warrant.’ 569 U.S.

at

Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1291-92

—,

133 S.Ct.

(9th Cir.

at

1568, 185

1998) (“In Schmerber,

Supreme Court held that a law enforcement ofﬁcer may Withdraw a blood sample from a person

under arrest despite his 0r her refusal 0n the advice 0f counsel.”).

Moreover, the key consideration under the “discovery exception”
basis for the cause of the action.

Judd

V. State,

remedy or

Chapman

(citing Gutierrez v.

Moﬁd, 39 Ca1.3d

V. State,

1,

5 (Ct.

commencement 0f the

128 Idaho 733, 735, 918 P.2d 602, 604 (Ct. App. 1996)

892, 705 P.3d 886, 889 (1985)).

Lastly, Ellis’s assertion that his untimely successive post-conviction ﬁling

ineffective assistance 0f either or both his trial counsel

demonstrate grounds for equitable

App. 2009)

A plaintiff’s ignorance of

legal theories underlying the action does not postpone

limitation period.

the factual, not legal,

148 Idaho 22, 26, 218 P.3d

(quoting Allen V. State, 118 Wash.2d 753, 826 P.2d 200, 202 (1992)).
his legal

is

tolling.

and

initial

was

the result of

post-conviction counsel does not

Ineffective assistance 0f counsel

is

not one 0f the

recognized grounds for the equitable tolling ofthe one-year LC. § 19-4902(a) statute of limitations.

E

Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386,

256 P.3d at 794. Nor does

10

ineffective assistance ofpost-conviction

counsel constitute “sufﬁcient reason” under I.C. § 19-4908 for ﬁling a successive petition.7

Mugphy V.

State,

demonstrate
his

156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014). In any event,

how any ineffective

McNeely claim

assistance 0f counsel actually prevented

court correctly concluded that Ellis

that,

under

I.C. §

him from timely raising

was not

district court

(Appendix A), the

entitled t0 equitable tolling

under LC.

district

§ 19-4902(a),

19-4908 and Charboneau, he failed to ﬁle his successive post—conviction

petition Within a “reasonable time”

(or

has failed t0

in a successive post-conviction petition.

For the above reasons, and the reasons stated by the

and

Ellis

and for “sufﬁcient reason”

even “legal”) basis for his McNeely claim. Therefore,

after

Ellis

he became aware of the factual

has failed to show that the

district

court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests that this

Court afﬁrm the

dismissing Ellis’ successive petition for post-conviction

DATED this

district court’s

order summarily

relief.

14th day of January, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

7

As

discussed above, an analysis of Whether “sufﬁcient reason” exists t0 ﬁle a successive petition
includes an analysis of whether the petition was ﬁled within a “reasonable time” after the
petitioner’s discovery

of the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau, 144 Idaho

at 874.

11

at

904, 174 P.3d
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First Judicial District,

COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE 0F IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE DISTRICT

JERRY ELLIS, II,

)

Case No. CV28-18-3349

)

Petitioner,

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

vs.

)

AND ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY

)

DISPOSITION

)
)

STATE 0F IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

In this case, Petitioner seeks post~conviction

relief.

This matter comes before the

Court on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition.
below, the Court

gza_I_1t_s

For the reasons

set forth

Respondent’s motion.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

This Court takes judicial notice of the underlying criminal case, Kootenai County

Case No. CR-2009-20230, and Petitioner’s previous post-conviction

County Case No. CR-2014-7988. In the criminal case
felony DUI.

Petitioner appealed,

relief case, Kootenai

case, Petitioner pled guilty to a

and the Court of Appeals afﬁrmed in an unpublished

decision (Dkt. Nos. 40898 and 40901).
Petitioner then ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief, Kootenai’

No. CR-2014~7988,

in

which he alleged

that the State erred

County Case

by providing incorrect

medical care, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that the

tn’al

Judge
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made numerous

errors,

and that he received

of appellate counsel.

ineffective assistance

That petition was dismissed on the State’s motion for summary dismissal.
In

this

case,

claims

Petitioner

(1)

was

Petitioner

convicted

under

an

unconstitutional statute (LC. § 18~8002), (2) Illegal search and seizure, (3) Ineffective

of counsel,

assistance

(4) Involuntary

and unintelligently made plea, (5) Petitioner was

denied his request to speak to his counsel by a police ofﬁcer before submitting to
scientiﬁc testing, (6) Evidence of material facts not previously presented or heard,
Ineﬂ‘ective assistance of postwonviction relief appellate counsel in

and

(7)

Case No. CV-2014—

7988 and Case No. CV-2014-7938. Amended Second Petitionfor Post-Conviction

Relief,

p. 2.

STANDARD

II.

Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil in nature.

State,

148 Idaho 240, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009).

upon which

allegations

Goodwin

State, 138 Idaho 269, 271: 61 P.3d 626,

v.

An

the requested relief is based

LC.

§

1941907; Rhoades

Petitioners

must prove

v.

the

by a preponderance of the evidence.
628

(Ct.

App. 2002).

application for post—conviction relief differs from a complaint in an

ordinary civil action, however, for an application must contain

than “a short and

plai‘n

statement of the claim”

complaint under I.R.C.P.

8(a)(1).

Rather,

‘

t

much more

would sufﬁce

an application

for

for a

post-

conviction relief must be veriﬁed with respect to facts within the personal

knowledge of the applicant, and
supporting its allegations must be

affidavits, records or other

attached, or the application

evidence

must

state

not attached. LC. § 19—4903. In other
words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible

why

such supporting evidence

evidence supporting

its

is

allegations, or the application will

be subject

to

dismissal.

Martinez
court

v.

may

Stare,

126 Idaho 313, 816, s92 P.2d 488, 491

(Ct.

take judicial notice of the underlying criminal case.

App. 1995).

Hays

v.

A

disuict

State, 113 Idaho
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736, 739, 747 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 1987), aﬂ‘d in part and vacated in part, 115 Idaho
315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988).

Summary

dismissal of petitions for post—conviction relief arc reviewed by

applying the same standards utilized by the
petitioner’s admissible evidence

petitioner to relief.

sets

trial

courts to determine whether the

forth facts, which,

LC. § 19-4906; Ridgley

v.

State,

if true,

would

entitle the

148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925,

929 (2010).

Summary

disposition of a petition for postwonviction relief is appropriate

evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. 0n
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, [appellate courts] will determine whether a genuine
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
if the applicant's

together with any afﬁdavits on ﬁle and will liberally construe the facts and
court is required
reasonable inferences in favor of the non—moving party.

A

to accept the petitioner's umebutted allegations as true, but need not accept
the petitioner's conclusions. When the alleged facts, even if true, would not
entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court

may

dismiss the application

without holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations contained in the
application are insufﬁcient for the granting of relief

when

(1)

they are

clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not
justify relief as

Johnson

v.

State,

a matter of law.

162 Idaho 213, 395 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2017).
I

m.
A. Timeliness

- LC. §

Respondent argues

ANALYSIS

l9-4902(a)

that the Petition in this case

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act

was not timely ﬁled.

requires that that a proceeding

The

be commenced

“within (l) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of

an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever
later.”

LC.

is

§ 19-4902(a).
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In this case, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued

October

7,

its

Unpublished Opinion on

2014, afﬁrming the Court’s orders revoking Petitioner’s probation and

ordering execution of sentences in his two underlying cases.

Holmes

in

Aﬂidavit of Jamila D.

Support ofMotion for Summary Disposition, Ex. A. The Remittitur was ﬁled

on January

5,

initiating this

2015.

case

Id.

at

Ex. B.

was ﬁled on

The Second

April 18, 2018.

Petition for Post—Conviotion Relief

Thus, Petitioner did not

commence

this

proceeding within one year from the determination of his appeal.

However, Petitioner raises an equitable tolling argument:
Idaho law does not preclude the granting of relief pursuant to a petition for
post-conviction relief that was ﬁled beyond the one-year deadline.

Because there may be claims that are not known to the defendant within
that time limit, we have held that there must be a reasonable time beyond
that deadline within which claims can be asserted once they are known.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904—05, 174 P.3d 870, 874—75
(2007). A petition raising any such claims “must be ﬁled within a
reasonable time aﬁer the petitioner has notice of the issue(s) raised.”

Charboneau

Windom

v.

State,

977, 200 L. Ed.

v.

State,

162 Idaho 160, 170, 395 P.3d 379, 389 (2017).

162 Idaho 417, 422, 398 P.3d 150, 155 (2017),

2d 247

cert.

denied, 138 S. Ct.

(2018).

Petitioner repeatedly claims that the delay in ﬁling the present petitioner

was

caused by his attorney’s erroneous legal advice which constituted ineﬁ‘ective assistance

of counsel: “The

failure

ineffective assistance

ineffective assistance

of Petitioner’s former attorney

to timely

ﬁle a claim regarding

of counsel regarding the warrantlcss blood draw was
of counsel

suﬁ‘icient to equitably toll the statute

Petitioner ’s Brief in Opposition to Respondent’s

The following paragraph appears

in

and of itself

of limitations.”

Motion for Summary Disposition,

to state Petitioner’s

argument in

p. 8.

this regard:
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Petitioner contends that

when Petitioner became aware of the issue as a
when he contacted Douglas Pierce who advised

potential claim for relief

by ﬁling a federal writ of habeas corpus which was
signed on July 7, 2016 and ﬁled on July 11, 2016 (see Respondent’s
Exhibit G). This was aﬂer the couﬂ in Kootenai County District Court
granted dismissal in 7988 on August 31, 2015 and the Order granting the
voluntary dismissal on March 30, 2016 (See Respondent’s Exhibit E).
The federal writ of habeas was dismissed on May 9, 2018 (Respondent’s
Exhibit I). Petitioner ﬁled his second post-conviction Kootcnai County
3349 raised
(herein called 3349) case in this matter on April 18, 2018.

him

to seek relief

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims as well as the warrantless

blood draw

issue.

1d,, at p. 5.

Even
later

if Petitioner

“became aware of the

issue as a potential claim for relief” no

than the date of ﬁling his federal writ of habeas corpus on July 11, 2016 as he

claims, Pctitioner

April l8, 2018,

still

failed to ﬁle the

Second

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief until

more than one year aﬂer he claims he “became aware of the

issue as a

potential claim for relief.”

Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner argues that he could not have

this

claim for relief until his federal writ of habeas corpus was dismissed on

such claim

l8,

is

contradicted

known of

May

9,

201 8,

by the fact that Petitioner ﬁled the petition in this case on April

2018, prior to that dismissal.

The

Petition in this case

was not ﬁled “within

(1) year

from the expiration of the

time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a

proceeding following an appeal, whichever
not demonstrated that he

is entitled to

is later.” ~I.C.

§ 19-4902(a).

equitable tolling that

Petitioner has

would render the

Petition

timely.

l/
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B. Failure to Raise Issues on Appeal - LC. § 19-4901(b)

Respondent argues that most of the bases for

been raised on

Any

relief raised

by Petitioner could have

direct appeal, so they are barred.

which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is
and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless
it appears to the com, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by
afﬁdavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a
issue

forfeited

substantial doubt about the reliability of the

ﬁnding of guilt and could

not,

in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.

LC. § 19-4901(b).
In

this

case,

Petitioner

claims

(1)

Petitioner

was

convicted

under

an

unconstitutional statute (LC. § 18-8002), (2) Illegal search and seizure, (3) Ineﬁective
assistance of counsel, (4) Involuntary and unintelligently

denied

testing,

is

request to speak to his counsel

(6)

Evidence of material

Ineffective assistance

made

plea, (5) Petitioner

by a police ofﬁcer before submitting

to scientiﬁc

facts not previously presented or heard,

of post-conviction

relief appellate counsel in

was

and

(7)

Case No. CV-2014-

7988 and Case No. CV-2014-7938. Amended Second Petitionfor Post-Conviction

Relief,

p. 2.

Except for the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Petitioner’s claims actually

were and/or could have been raised in

direct appeals. Thus, Petitioner’s bases (1), (2), (4), (5),

rest

of

Petitioner’s previous

and (6) are dismissed pursuant to

LC. § 19-4901(b) because they could have been or were raised on direct appeal.
C. Second Petition

Respondent argues

is

Successive —~ LC. § 19—4908

that the

Second Petition

is

successive and

its

allegations axe

barred pursuant to LC. § 19-4908.
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All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act
raised in his original, supplemental or

amended

ﬁnally adjudicated or not so raised,
intelligently

waived in the proceeding

application.

or knowingly,

must be

Any ground

voluntarily

and

that resulted in the conviction or

sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief
not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court ﬁnds a

may

gr'ound for relief asserted

was inadequately

which for suﬁicient reason was not asserted or

raised

in

the

original,

supplemental,

or

amended

application.

I.C. §

194908.
Petitioner previously argued the ineﬁ'ectiveness

errors of the District Court,

2014-7988.

of counsel, the various alleged

and the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in Case No. CV-

Aﬁidavit of Jamila D. Holmes in Support of Motion for Summary

'

Disposition, Ex. F.

Except for the allegation of ineffective assistance of post-conviction

relief counsel, Petitioner’s

grounds for relief appear to be the same as those raised in the

previous post—conviotion relief case, and Petitioner does not provide any argument as to a

reason

why

the present claims could not have

been raised or were inadequately raised

in

the ﬁrst petition.

Moreovér, ineffective assistance of post~conviction counsel cannot constitute a
“sufﬁcient reason” to bring a successive petition under Idaho

State,

156 Idaho 389, 394, 327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (aff’d Johnson

213, 228, 395 P.3d 1246, 1261 (2017)).
Sixth

Code §19-4908. Murphy

Amendment

Coleman

v.

v.

v.

State, 162 Idaho

A non-capital post-conviction petitioner has no

right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 772, 752, 111

S.Ct. 2546,

2566 (1991)).

Id.,

(quoting

The Idaho

Court of Appeals subsequently elaborated on Murphy,

The

Idaho

Supreme

Court

addressed this issue, leaving no

in Murphy squarely and unequivocally
room for this Court to craﬂ an exception:

“ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel

is

not a sufﬁcient reason
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under LC. § 19—4908 for allowing a successive petition.” Murphy, 156
Idaho at 391, 327 P.3d at 367. This is true even if, as Lopez alleges, the
representation

was so deﬁcient

to

as

meaningﬁll representation because there

deprive the petitioner of any
no statutory or constitutional

is

right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.

'Lopez

v.

State,

157 Idaho 795, 798, 339 P.3d 1199, 1202

(Ct.

App. 2014).

Therefore, the Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

is

successive and

its

allegations are barred pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.

D. Petitioner has not shown that counsel was deﬁcient nor that he was
prej udiced thereby.

To

prevail

on a claim of ineffective

that their attorney’s

Strickland

v.

assistance of counsel, petitioners

must show

performance was deﬁcient and that they were prejudiced thereby.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578,

589, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007).

To

establish a deﬁciency, petitioners bear the

burden of showing that their attorney’s representation
reasonableness.

Aragon

v.

Stare,

establish prejudice, petitioners

fell

below an objective standard of

114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).

must show a reasonable probability

attorney’s deﬁcient performance, the outcome of the

trial

but for their

that,

would have been

To

different.

Id.

at 760, 1176.

The claims
569 U.S. 141, 133

Petitioner raises are based

S. Ct. 1552,

416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014).
testing should

on

the holdings in Missouri

185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) and State

Petitioner argues that test results

have been suppressed

in the

2009

DUI

v.

v.

McNeely,

Wulﬁj 157 Idaho

from warrantless blood

case against

him (CR-2009-20230)

and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of his counsel’s

failure to

challenge the admission of the warrantless blood test results.
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However, the
before the

DUI

arrest at issue in the underlying criminal matter occurred well

McNeely and Wulﬁ’dccisions were

April l7, 2013 and

Wulﬂ was

and imposition of sentence as
Petitioner’s arrest

6,

issued.

The McNeely decision was ﬁled on

ﬁled October 29, 20.14. Petitioner’s probation revocation
to the

and the blood

2006 and 2009 DUIs occurred on March 21, 2013.

test Petitioner

wishes to exclude occurred on September

2009.
Petitioner is seeking post—conviction relief for his counsel’s failure to raise an

issue based

on a decision

that did not exist at the time of his arrest for driving under the

inﬂuence, at the time of his conviction and sentence, at the time of his probation
violation, or at the time

at the

of his probation revocation and imposiﬁon of sentence. Rather,

time of Petitioner’s

DUI arrest, Idaho precedent held that forced blood draws based

on implied consent were permitted pursuant
warrant requirement. See State
Additionally, even if

v.

Wulﬁ',

to the alternate consent exception to the

157 Idaho 416, 420, 337 P.3d 575, 579 (2014).

McNeely had been issued

revocation and imposition of sentence, Petitioner has not

error for counsel to

have

failed to

move

to suppress the

police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance

the exclusionary rule does not apply.

2419, 2434 (201

Davis

v.

U.S.,

prior to Petitioner’s probation

shown

that

it

blood testing

would have been
results.

“[W]hen

on binding appeliate precedent,

564 U.S. 229, 249-50, 131

S.Ct.

1).

In this case, the police conducted the blood draw in objectively reasonable

reliance

on binding precedent

as

it

existed at the time of the blood draw, so the

exclusionary rule would not have prevented admission of the blood draw results.
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Therefore, Petitioner has not

shown

that his attorney’s

performance was deﬁcient

nor that hc was prejudiced thereby.
IV.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s motion for summary dismissal

is

GRANTED.

so ORDERED this [fday of February, 2019.
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